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Abstract: Turbine alarm systems can give useful information to remote technicians on the cause of a fault or stoppage. However,
alarms are generally generated at much too high a rate to gain any meaningful insight from on their own, so generally require
extensive domain knowledge of the specific alarm system. By grouping together commonly occurring alarm sequences, the burden
of analysis can be reduced. Instead of analysing many individual alarms that occur during a stoppage, the stoppage can be linked
to a commonly occurring sequence of alarms and that sequence’s associated characteristics.
In this research, we present a methodology to identify relevant alarms from specific turbine assemblies and group together similar
alarm sequences as they appear during stoppages. Batches of sequences associated with 456 different stoppages are created,
and features are extracted from these batches representing the order the alarms appeared in. The batches are then grouped
together using clustering techniques, and evaluated using silhouette analysis and manual inspection. The results show that almost
half of all stoppages can be attributed to one of 15 different alarm sequences. When one of these alarm sequences appears,
maintenance technicians or operators can be given information about the shared characteristics or root causes of stoppages
where that alarm sequence appeared in the past. This distils down the information that the technician is presented with, rather
than having to deal with the high volume of individual alarms which can cause information overload.
1 Introduction
Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs for wind turbines can ac-
count for 18-30% of the cost of generation of wind power [1–4]. This
is, in part, due to the highly irregular loads they experience from var-
ied and turbulent wind conditions, so components can undergo high
stress throughout their lifetime when compared with other rotating
machines [5]. In addition, modern wind farms have large numbers
of turbines, often deployed in remote or even offshore locations,
making remote monitoring essential [6].
In the case of offshore turbines, access for maintenance or spot
checks can be very expensive and weather dependent [7]. The trans-
port cost for a maintenance crew to an offshore farm can range from
e85/hr on relatively small vessels which are highly dependent on
calm seas, to over e400/hr for larger vessels and helicopters [8].
Because of this, it is important to have robust control and monitor-
ing systems which can detect faults and notify technicians, without
raising false alarms. Furthermore, if a specific type of fault and an
estimated time to failure can be predicted in advance, preventative
measures can be taken to either avoid the fault or schedule mainte-
nance at an optimal time, e.g. during good weather or during other
maintenance activities to minimise the offshore trips needed. Hence,
the offshore wind industry is driving maintenance from responsive or
schedule-based activities to a more proactive and predictive strategy,
with the need for strong remote monitoring capabilities [9].
Using machine learning and other data-driven analysis techniques
on wind turbine Supervisory Control and Acquisition (SCADA) data
to detect, diagnose and predict faults and turbine downtime is one
way to ahcieve these goals [10–14]. A recent detailed review of all
these methods can be found in [6], where the authors note that al-
though there have been some successes, there is still work to be done
before SCADA-based monitoring solutions can be commercially vi-
able. To use these data-driven methods effectively, the data must be
correctly labelled; i.e., the periods when the turbine was in faulty
operation, or periods when a fault was developing, must be estab-
lished [10]. As well as this, the root cause of the fault and its failure
mode are important to characterise the fault in terms of severity and
possible down time. Ways of identifying periods of faulty operation
include cross-referencing with maintenance logs and using turbine
alarm or availability data [15, 16]. However, this can be tedious and
cumbersome; maintenance logs are not always standardised across
turbines or even maintenance events, and may be stored as written
documents rather than in a failure database [17]. Turbine alarms, on
the other hand, are a promising way of identifying faulty periods, but
often their effectiveness is reduced by the sheer volume of alarms
generated.
In the following section, we give an overview of wind turbine
alarms and why they can be hard to interpret, as well as work done
in the area to improve their usefulness. We then give the motivation
for our own work and the research objectives that this work hopes to
achieve. In section 3, we outline the data used in this study. In section
4, we give an overview of our proposed methodology and apply it to
an operating wind farm. In section 5, we discuss the effectiveness
of the results achieved, and in section 6 give our conclusions and
discuss future applications of the work.
2 Background
Turbine alarm systems vary widely between manufacturers, but gen-
erally share the same broad functionality. At their highest level,
alarms (also called events or statuses by some manufacturers) are
generated when the turbine operating state changes. There are
usually different types of alarms depending on their severity:
• Information alarms are generally to communicate changes in cer-
tain operating conditions, e.g. when the wind speed is too low for
generation, or a manual switch has been engaged.
• Warning alarms, on the other hand, are generated when the con-
trol system detects operating conditions or control variables that
come close to exceeding certain thresholds.
• Fault alarms are generated when these thresholds are exceeded.
Note that the term “alarm” itself is sometimes used to refer to
fault alarms exclusively by some original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs), with information messages and warnings used to refer to
the other types. In this research, we exclusively use the terms “infor-
mation alarms”, “warning alarms” and “fault alarms” as described
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Table 1 Sample Alarms Data
Turbine ts te Code Description Category Type
8 2015/06/01 17:13:38 2015/06/01 17:25:05 a41 Storm shutdown - wind speed too high Weather Information
2 2015/06/02 10:19:05 2015/06/02 10:19:05 a124 Motor Fuse Protection Warning Generator Warning
4 2015/06/03 07:56:14 2015/06/03 07:57:32 a91 Low wind speed cut out Weather Information
10 2015/11/04 08:38:27 2015/11/04 08:38:37 a81 Freq. Converter Line CCU current Fault Freq. Conv. Fault
6 2016/02/02 15:05:38 2016/02/02 15:11:01 a51 Manual emergency stop initiated User Critical Fault
9 2016/02/01 01:26:46 2016/02/01 01:26:54 a22 Normal Operation No Fault Information
above, whereas “alarms” by itself refers to any or all of the three in
general.
Turbine alarms can occur in very high volumes. In [18], the au-
thors found that the quantity of alarms raised is generally too high
for operators to effectively manage. This is even higher during fault
periods, when alarms occur in large and complex “showers”, mak-
ing failure detection, location and diagnosis difficult. By performing
probability and time-based analyses, alarms which regularly appear
together or trigger one another can be identified, and from this
it is possible to identify particular failure modes related to alarm
sequences.
In [19], the authors acknowledge the problems associated with the
volume of alarms being generated by wind farms. They aimed to re-
duce this by using pattern recognition techniques based on artificial
neural networks (ANNs) to identify alarm patterns which occurred
during particular fault events. The authors found that by process-
ing any alarm occurrences through the ANN model, faults could be
flagged without the need for an operator to try and analyse the alarms
themselves, thereby reducing the number of alarms that operators
must work with. However, they noted that further work is needed to
improve the accuracy of this method.
Mapping turbine alarms to a standardised taxonomy can help
build a better picture of how faults propagate through various sys-
tems and understand the root cause of turbine stoppages [8, 20].
Taxonomy in this instance refers to how parts of the turbine are la-
belled and broken down into sub-systems (e.g. power module; rotor
& blades; or nacelle) and assemblies within these sub-systems (e.g.
the pitch system or blade bearings within the rotor & blades sub-
system) in a standardised, OEM-agnostic fashion. Examples include
the RDS-PP standard developed by VGB PowerTech e.V. [21], or
ReliaWind-recommended taxonomy [22]. In [20], an extension to
the ReliaWind taxonomy is proposed to standardise failure and relia-
bility reporting across OEMs and turbine models. In [23], the authors
show that by mapping turbine alarms to this taxonomy and perform-
ing a similar probability analysis to that of [18], alarms which are
directly related to faults can be identified and the propagation of a
fault from root cause to failure mode can be manually established.
Mapping the alarms to a taxonomy, or even in some cases de-
coding the meaning of some ambiguous alarms, can be difficult
without intimate knowledge of the turbine control system. This “ex-
pert knowledge” is usually obtained by maintenance technicians or
operators through training and experience. In the absence of such
training or experience, good quality documentation and some basic
knowledge of wind turbine technology can provide some of the in-
formation, but issues with data access and availability can limit the
effectiveness of such an approach. This can make it difficult to know
if some alarms are relevant to faults in a sub-system or assembly, or
attributed to reactions to this fault.
In the case of faults in the pitch system, for example, if a pitch mo-
tor fault is detected, there are several contingency measures in place
that kick in to avoid emergency situations. These include emergency
brakes to stop the blades turning in case of a storm, and backup bat-
teries in case power supply to the turbine is interrupted. Hence, if a
pitch motor fault occurs, a number of alarms are generated to give
information about the status of the auxiliary systems, or even faults
in these auxiliary systems themselves, along with alarms related to
the original fault. Without access to quality documentation and an
intimate knowledge of the particular alarm system, it can, in some
cases, be hard to decide which alarms are attributable to the original
pitch motor fault, and which are to do with the auxiliary systems.
Furthermore, the presence of a turbine alarm is not always in-
dicative of a fault, with the associated turbine shut-down intended to
avoid damage taking place [20]. Tavner explains that turbine “fail-
ure rates” often cited in literature can really be regarded as “stoppage
rates” [8]. These are usually the result of the turbine controller de-
tecting an operational condition outside of acceptable bounds, such
as over-speed, over-temperature or control problem, and generat-
ing a fault alarm. In the majority of cases, these stoppages result in
an automatic or manual remote reset. However, historical stoppages
>24 hours may be indicative that a manual inspection or repair was
required as a result of some form of damage taking place.
If less severe stoppages of a shorter length of time are occurring
frequently, they can be indicative of a wider problem on the turbine
and can themselves contribute to reduced availability. However, be-
cause shorter stoppages are often resolved by a simple turbine reset,
they can be overlooked by operators who may feel the effort required
to analyse the density of alarms generated in such events is out-
weighed by the actual impact on turbine availability that any single
short stoppage incurs.
In this paper, we aim to reduce the burden of analysis related
to alarm showers which occur during turbine stoppages, however
severe the reason for, or length of, the stoppage. This is achieved
through two broad objectives:
• Identify “batches” of alarm sequences related to a particular
turbine assembly which occur during stoppages
• Automatically group batches which contain similar alarm se-
quences together through the use of clustering techniques
In this way, each stoppage can be attributed to a specific type
of sequence with its associated characteristics, rather than a large
number of individual alarms which must be analysed. This reduces
the burden of analysis for technicians as stoppages related to spe-
cific alarm sequences can be investigated for shared characteristics.
This would allow information such as the probable root cause of the
stoppage to be instantly known whenever such an alarm sequence
reappears in future.
3 Description of Data
The data used in this study comes from an Irish wind farm with
eleven 2.5 MW Doubly Fed Induction Generator (DFIG) turbines.
The study covers a period of eleven months from June 2015 to April
2016. There were 118 days across all turbines where a maintenance
team was on-site during this period. 56 of these days were due to 35
individual fault instances on the turbines which could not be fixed or
diagnosed remotely. The remaining 62 days were due to scheduled
periodic maintenance or upgrade work. Stoppages which did not re-
quire a maintenance call-out, e.g. when the turbine went down due
to a fault which could be corrected remotely, were not recorded by
the operator. The data used was alarm data from the turbines’ OEM
alarm system. A sample of this data can be seen in table 1.
Each alarm has a start time and an end time, though some alarms
(e.g. certain information or warning alarms) can be instantaneous.
Each specific alarm has an associated code and description, as well
as a category and type. The categories of alarms are assigned by the
OEM and are related to their functional location on the turbine, e.g.
“Pitch”, “Brake” or “Frequency Converter”. Other categories contain
alarms which are in some way logically connected, e.g. “weather”
for weather-related alarms or “user” which are alarms which have
been started by the user. The alarm type, on the other hand, is one
of: information, warning, fault, or critical fault. This is also assigned
by the OEM. These correspond to the descriptions of general turbine
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Fig. 1: Methodology overview
alarm systems given in section 2, with the exception that fault alarms
are further split into “fault” and “critical fault”. Both of these alarm
types cause a turbine stoppage and require a reset. However, “critical
faults” require a manual reset of the turbine as they generally warrant
further investigation to make sure they are not part of a more serious
issue.
Each alarm also gives the mean power output and wind speed
which was seen over the course of the duration of the alarm. For
both types of fault alarms, the power output is usually zero, or even
negative where the turbine’s systems are taking power from the grid
to stay functional during downtime.
4 Methodology
The methodology developed in this research is split into two broad
parts and summarised in figure 1. The first part focuses on iden-
tifying alarms relevant to potential faults which could occur in a
particular assembly (e.g. the pitch system or frequency converter).
We focus on a single assembly at a time in order to reduce the
complexity of the analysis. The term “assembly” here refers to
the definition as it appears in the ReliaWind taxonomy [8]. This
taxonomy breaks down turbine parts into “sub-systems”, e.g. the ro-
tor or drive train, “assemblies” within these sub-systems, e.g. the
pitch system within the rotor, “sub-assemblies” within the assem-
blies, e.g. the pitch drive, and individual “components” within these
sub-assemblies, e.g. the pitch motors.
The second part of the methodology then focuses on identifying
sequences, or “batches”, of these alarms as they appeared during
stoppages related to faults in the assembly, and using cluster analysis
to group similar batches together. In this way, stoppages which share
a similar sequence of relevant alarms can be grouped together. Fur-
ther investigation can then be performed in order to identify a root
cause for these stoppages. When a particular alarm sequence appears
in future, the root cause will be known with minimal further analy-
sis needed. The rest of this section is split into detailed sub-sections
which correspond to each of the steps outlined in figure 1.
It should also be noted that, in this work, “alarm instance” refers
to an individual alarm in the dataset, not to be confused with “alarm”,
which refers to that type of alarm (as opposed to a specific instance
of it), or “alarm code”, which refers to the code for that alarm. Alarm
codes, and in some cases descriptions, have been changed for pur-
poses of anonymity, and are referred to as a1, a2, a3, etc. ts refers
to the start time of an alarm.
4.1 Identification of Relevant Alarms
4.1.1 Choose assembly to focus on: In order to reduce the
complexity for analysis, a single turbine assembly at a time is anal-
ysed in this methodology, e.g. frequency converter, generator, pitch
system, etc. Figure 2 shows the frequency of fault alarms according
to their OEM-assigned category in the alarm system. These alarms
are from all eleven turbines over the eleven-month period of the
study, as detailed in section 3. As can be seen, the pitch system
has the most frequent fault alarms. For this reason, we focus on this
assembly in this study.
4.1.2 Identify all alarms related to this assembly: As stated
in section 2, identifying alarms related to a specific assembly can
be complicated by the volume of alarms and, in some cases, lack
of clarity on their function or the relevant part of the taxonomy to
which they belong. Hence, a probability-based analysis as described
in [18] and [23] is performed which gives insights into groups of
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Fig. 2: Number of alarm instances with type “Fault” or “Critical
Fault” by OEM-assigned category
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Fig. 3: Network diagram of pitch system alarm triggers, grouped according to the sub-assembly which they belong to. The arrows are labelled
with the probability one alarm will trigger another, and the absolute number of times this happened shown in brackets
related alarms and which alarms trigger each other. This gives us
an easy to interpret visual aid for what alarms could be important
in determining periods of faulty operation related to a particular
assembly.
Before doing the probability analysis, all possible alarms related
to the assembly in question are identified. These include informa-
tion, warning and fault (including critical fault) alarms related to the
assembly itself as well as the auxiliary and support systems. If there
are certain alarms where it is not clear to which system they belong
to, they should be included anyway.
In this case, all alarms relating to the pitch system and its auxiliary
support systems were included, for a total of 58 alarms, referred to
here as L.
4.1.3 Perform probability-based analysis to narrow down
alarms to only those relevant to faults in this assembly: The
probability based analysis is performed as follows:
1. From the set of alarmsL, all combinations of pairs of alarm codes
are found,
(L
2
)
.
2. For each pair of alarm codes a1 and a2, count the number of
instances of alarm a1 which have triggered one or more instances of
a2 and vice-versa.
An instance of a1 is said to trigger an instance of a2 if the
following conditions are met:
tsa1 <= tsa2 ∧ tea1 >= tsa2
where tsa1 , tsa2 and tea2 are the start time of alarm instances a1
and a2, and the end time of instance a1, respectively.
3. Calculate the probability that an instance of a1 will trigger one
or more a2s, and vice-versa, where the probability of an instance of
a1 triggering one or more instances of a2 is given as:
Pr(a1triga2) = |a1triga2|/|a1|
4. From here, the relationship between the two alarms will be
determined as follows:
(a) If Pr(a1triga2) >= 0.7 and Pr(a2triga1) >= 0.7, then
alarms a1 & a2 usually appear together
(b) If Pr(a1triga2) <= 0.2 and Pr(a2triga1) <= 0.2, a1 & a2
never or rarely appear together
(c) If Pr(a1triga2) >= 0.7 and Pr(a2triga1) <= 0.2, a2 will
usually be triggered whenever alarm a1 appears; a2 is a more general
alarm
(d) If Pr(a1triga2) <= 0.2 and Pr(a2triga1) >= 0.7, a1 will
usually be triggered whenever alarm a2 appears; a1 is a more general
alarm
(e) If none of the above, the two alarms are randomly or somewhat
related
The results of this allow us to identify alarms related to different
aspects of the chosen assembly, which will be analysed in the next
step. We can exclude alarms related to specific auxiliary systems
or manual intervention which are usually reactions to faults which
have occurred in the assembly we are focusing on, or are simply not
relevant. This step can be made easier by graphically analysing the
results of the probability analysis in a network diagram. We refer to
the final set of k alarm codes obtained as Ar:
Ar = [a1, . . . , ak]
In this case, the probability-based analysis was performed on the
58 alarms identified in the previous step. A network diagram show-
ing the relationships between these alarms was then constructed, as
seen in figure 3. An alarm with an arrow leading from it to another
alarm indicates that it usually triggers the other alarm. The num-
bers labelled along the arrows show the probability of one alarm
triggering another, with the absolute number of times the alarm was
triggered shown in brackets. Alarms which were not shown to gen-
erally trigger other alarms were left out of this diagram. This allows
us to attribute alarms to various sub-assemblies or functions within
the relevant assembly, where it is not clear from the documentation.
As can be seen, there are a number of different “groups” of alarms,
related to different sub-assemblies within the pitch system.
The alarms to be analysed in the next step were selected according
to the following criteria:
• The alarm causes the wind turbine to stop generating
• The alarm is not related to a reaction to another alarm, e.g. safety-
chain or maintenance-related alarms
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• There were enough instances (> 25) of the alarm for it to be
analysed effectively
Alarms related to the battery backup and emergency braking sys-
tems, and alarms related to manual control or maintenance were
excluded, as well as alarms which do not cause the turbine to stop
generating (e.g. information messages related to system tests). Of
the remaining alarms, only those with enough instances for useful
analysis were included, i.e. >25 instances. This number was found
heuristically by iterating through this methodology to find a good
balance of including relevant alarms without introducing too much
noise caused by very rarely occurring alarms. This left us with a set
of 30 alarms relevant to faults in the pitch system.
Alarms which represent the same fault, but, for example, on a
separate turbine blade axis, were given the same shared alarm code.
This was to ensure that alarm sequences along different axes would
be grouped together as the same type of fault. For example, alarm
codes a18, a19 and a20 represent ’Pitch Control Deviation on Axis
x fault’, where x is 1, 2 or 3, respectively. All these alarm codes have
been renamed a18, to group them together as one. There were 12 of
these “duplicate” alarms, to give us a final set of 18 relevant alarms
for further analysis:
Ar = [a1, a2, . . . , a18]
4.2 Group similar sequences of alarms
4.2.1 Create “batches” of relevant alarm sequences: Be-
fore clustering, “batches” of fault alarm sequences which occur
during stoppages must be identified.
The first step is to identify the alarm code that signifies the turbine
returning to normal operation. This is usually an information alarm
to communicate that the turbine has been brought back on-line after a
fault alarm-related stoppage. In this case we refer to this code as an.
Its associated description was “returning to normal operation”. Once
this has been found, the next step is to create “batches” of alarm
sequences associated with each turbine, i.e. the alarm instances in
each batch must all belong to the same turbine.
Each batch is created as follows. For the purposes of this descrip-
tion, “Ar alarms” refer to alarm instances whose code is one of the
codes in Ar .
1. Find the earliest occurring Ar alarm in the data. Store its ts as
tstart
2. Find the next earliest occurring an alarm in the data. Store its ts
as tend
3. Create a batch of Ar alarms with:
tstart ≥ ts < tend
4. Select the next earliest occurring Ar alarm in the data. Store its
ts as tstart
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until no more Ar alarms in the data.
In our case, the results of this were a total of 456 batches of alarm
sequences representing 456 individual stoppages across all 11 tur-
bines in the 12 months of data. A typical example of a batch can be
seen in table 2. It should be noted here that the final an alarm itself is
Table 2 Example of a batch of alarm sequences (all alarms belong to same
turbine)
ts Code Description
24/12/2015 09:05:40 a1 Blade angle asymmetry
a2 Pitch thyristor fault
24/12/2015 09:05:52 a4 Blade braking time too high
24/12/2015 09:06:22 a1 Blade angle asymmetry
a3 Pitch control deviation
a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blade
24/12/2015 09:06:57 a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blade
Batch 1
ts Code
13:07:13 a3
a1
13:10:48 a4
→ F =

0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

;
Batch 2
ts Code
15:02:00 a2 → F =

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Fig. 4: Simplified examples of F1 construction
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Fig. 5: Distribution of number of alarm instances and unique tss in
each batch
not included in the batch at the analysis stage, but is provided when
displaying batches so as to see how long the stoppage lasted. As can
be seen, there are a mixture of alarms which occur individually and
simultaneously (sharing common tss) to give a total number of 7
alarm instances with with four different tss.
4.2.2 Extract features from these batches: In order for the
clustering to be effective, useful features from the alarm sequences
must be extracted. Three separate ways of extracting feature vectors
for each sample, F1, F2 and F3, are explored.
F1 - Base Case
The first feature extraction method was based solely on the or-
der the alarms appeared in each batch. Batches can have a varying
number of alarms, but in order to stop outlier batches with a dis-
proportionately large number of alarms influencing the clustering
algorithm, only batches with up to a certain maximum number of
alarm instances, ma, are included.
The feature vector for a batch, F1, consists of a vector of 0s
of length k ∗ma, with a 1 being placed in the relevant location
indicating the presence of an alarm:
F1 = [f
1
1 , f
1
2 , . . . , f
1
k , . . . , f
ma
1 , f
ma
2 , . . . , f
ma
k ]
T
A simplified example can be seen in figure 4, where there are four
possible alarm codes, and a maximum of three alarm instances, i.e.
k = 4,ma = 3 andAr = [a1, a2, a3, a4]. In batch 1, the first alarm
is a3, so a 1 is placed at f13 . The second alarm is a1, so a 1 is placed
at f21 . The third and final alarm is a4, so a 1 is placed at f
3
4 . In batch
2, there is only one alarm, a2, so a 1 is placed at f12 . Note that the
horizontal lines in the vector here are just to make the example easier
to interpret.
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Batch 1
ts Code
13:08:02 a1
a2
a4
13:08:50 a3
13:12:10 a1
a3
→ F =

1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

;
Batch 2
ts Code
15:02:30 a1
a2 → F =

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Fig. 6: Simplified examples of F2 construction
Figure 5 shows the distribution of number of alarm instances and
unique tss per batch in the dataset used in this study. As can be seen,
over 90% of batches had between 1 and 10 alarm instances, so in
this case ma = 20 was selected as the maximum number of alarm
instances. This led to 425 batches with an average of 6.75 alarms
per batch. With k = 18 possible alarms, the length of each feature
vector F was 18 ∗ 20 = 360.
F2 - Incorporating simultaneous start times
The batch in table 2 has a number of alarms occurring simultane-
ously. This is a similar case for many batches, so it was decided to
extract a feature set that takes this into account by grouping alarms
according to their ts. To protect from the influence of outliers, only
batches with up to a certain maximum number of ts, mt, were in-
cluded. This is similar to F1, where only batches with up to a certain
number of unique alarms were included.
The feature vector for a sample, F2, once again consisted of a
vector of 0s, this time of length k ∗mt:
F2 = [f
1
1 , f
1
2 , . . . , f
1
k , . . . , f
mt
1 , f
mt
2 , . . . , f
mt
k ]
T
A simplified example is shown in figure 6, using k = 4, mt = 3
and Ar = [a1, a2, a3, a4]. In the first batch, there are three alarms
occurring at the first ts (13:08:02), a1, a2 and a4, so 1s are placed
at f11 , f
1
2 and f
1
4 . There is only one alarm, a3 at the next ts, so an
alarm is placed at f23 . Two alarms, a1 and a3 occur at the final ts, so
1s are placed at f31 and f
3
3
As seen in figure 5, over 90% of batches have between 1 and 10
unique tss, so mt was set to 10. This translated to 417 batches, with
a mean of 6.57 alarms spread across 3.84 tss in each batch. Each
feature vector was 18 ∗ 10 = 180 long.
F3 - Incorporating the time between each ts
The final feature extraction method expands on the previous
method by incorporating the time between each ts, representing how
long the alarms at that ts persisted before other alarms were trig-
gered. It does this by making two slight changes to F2. First, the
time in seconds between each tsis added as an extra feature at the
end of each group of k alarms seen in F2. In the case of the last
alarm, the time between its ts and the ts of the “returning to normal
operation” alarm for that batch, an, is used. This means the final
length of the vector is (k + 1) ∗mt.
Because the new features can be  1, there is a chance the
clusters could be heavily biased towards grouping batches with sim-
ilar numbers of ts, and the time between these tss, without taking
into account the actual alarm codes themselves. Hence, the second
change is that different values can be substituted for 1, such as 100,
1000, etc.
An example is provided in figure 7. This is identical to the exam-
ple in the last section, but with the extra features added. Note that
in this example X = 100, so 1s are replaced with 100s. In the first
batch, the first “extra” feature is 48, signifying the time difference in
seconds between the first ts (13:08:02) and the second ts (13:08:50),
so this is placed at position f15 . The fourth and final ts is 13:12:10,
and the ts of an is 13:15:10. This is 150s after the final ts, so 150
is placed at position F 45 . Note that the an alarms are included here
Batch 1
ts Code
13:08:02 a1
a2
a4
13:08:50 a3
13:12:10 a1
a3
13:15:10 an
→ F =

100
100
0
100
48
0
0
100
0
140
100
0
100
0
150

;
Batch 2
ts Code
15:02:30 a1
a2
15:04:35 an → F =

X
X
0
0
125
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Fig. 7: Simplified examples of F3 construction
only to show where the final “extra” feature comes from; they aren’t
included in batches during cluster analysis.
As before, we use batches with between 1 and 10 unique tss, for
a total of 417 batches. Each feature vector this time was (18 + 1) ∗
10 = 190 long.
4.2.3 Perform cluster analysis: Identifying patterns in high-
dimensional data with no “ground truth” to learn from is an un-
supervised learning problem [24]. Cluster analysis is a powerful
unsupervised learning technique that is used to identify patterns in
samples of data and group samples with similar patterns together, so
is ideally suited to this problem [25]. The main goal of clustering is
to group a collection of objects into separate subsets or “clusters”,
so that the objects in each cluster are more similar to each other than
those in other clusters.
Agglomerative clustering is a type of hierarchical, or tree-based,
clustering which is well suited to data that has a large number of
clusters. In this case, there may be many different alarm sequences
so this is an appropriate technique to use. It starts by assigning ev-
ery individual sample into its own unique cluster. It then looks at
the pairwise similarity between all the clusters, and merges the two
which are most similar to each other. It repeats this process until
some specified number of clusters remain. The result of this is a
binary tree linking each sample into one of a number of clusters
[25]. In this work, the Euclidean distance between the centre of each
cluster is used as a similarity metric.
Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DB-
SCAN), is another powerful clustering technique that does not need
many parameters and automatically decides on an optimal number
of clusters. DBSCAN views clusters as areas of high density (i.e.
many samples in close proximity to each other) separated by areas
of low density. It does this by first assigning some samples as “core”
samples. These are defined as samples which have a certain min-
imum number of “neighbours”, with neighbours being defined as
samples within some minimum amount of distance to them. Clus-
ters are built by recursively selecting a core sample, finding all of
its neighbours which are core samples, finding all of their neighbour
core samples, and repeating until there are no further neighbour core
samples within that cluster. All other samples which are not core
samples (i.e. don’t meet the minimum number of neighbours), but
which are themselves neighbours of a core sample, are assigned to
that core sample’s cluster. Any samples which are not in the neigh-
bourhood of any core sample are classed as outliers, and not assigned
a cluster. In this way, DBSCAN decides on its own optimal num-
ber of clusters[26]. Because DBSCAN automatically decides on an
optimal number of clusters, it was decided to compare this with
agglomerative clustering in this work.
Clustering performance was evaluated in two ways. First, the sil-
houette coefficient was used as a measure of how well defined the
clusters are. The silhouette coefficient is defined as follows:
s =
b− a
max(a, b)
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Table 3 Results Summary
Feature Set - Algo. No. Clusters Avg. Sil. % > .9 Accurate Sil.?
1 - Agg 20 .2 16 Y
1 - DBSCAN 13 1 27.3 Y
2 - Agg 20 .39 3.8 Y
2 - DBSCAN 15 1 45.1 Y
3 - Agg (X = 1) 8 .82 91.4 N
3 - DBSCAN (X = 1) 7 .93 41.2 N
where a is the mean distance between a sample and all other sam-
ples in the same cluster, and b is the mean distance between a sample
and all other points in the next nearest cluster. The silhouette coef-
ficient takes a value between -1 and 1, with 1 meaning the point is
far away from its neighbouring cluster, 0 meaning it’s on the bound-
ary, and -1 meaning the point has possibly been misclassified. The
silhouette coefficient is hence a score given to every sample in a
cluster and is evaluated graphically, as will be seen in section 5.
The silhouette coefficient is a good indication of how well the
clustering is performing, but only if the features that have been ex-
tracted accurately represent the underlying data. For this reason, in
some cases, a manual inspection of the clusters was performed to en-
sure that good/bad silhouette scores translated to effective clustering
for this specific use case. The manual inspection involved selecting
2-3 samples from each cluster and checking if the alarm sequences in
each sample were similar to each other if there was a high silhouette
score, or dissimilar for a low silhouette score.
The agglomerative clustering and DBSCAN algorithms were ap-
plied to the three different feature sets extracted in the previous step,
F1, F2 and F3, with F3 being trained with various different values of
X;X ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000}. Since agglomerative clustering takes a
specific number of clusters as an input, it is normally trained several
times with a number of different clusters to find the optimal num-
ber. Here, the analysis was carried out for between 2 and 20 clusters,
with the optimal number of clusters being selected according to the
one with the highest silhouette coefficient.
Once the optimum number of clusters has been found for ag-
glomerative clustering, it is evaluated against DBSCAN. The final
evaluation is performed again using the silhouette score, with the ef-
fectiveness of the score being checked via manual inspection. The
most effective method is decided heuristically, e.g. if agglomerative
clustering manages to group 40% of clusters with reasonable accu-
racy, but DBSCAN classifies 30% of clusters with perfect accuracy,
then DBSCAN in that case would be a better choice. The results of
this can be found in the following section.
5 Clustering Results
As described in section 4.2.1 (step 2.1 from figure 1), 456 batches
were created from the full set of data. Three sets of features, F1, F2
and F3 were extracted from these batches, as described in section
4.2.2 (step 2.2 of figure 1). With ma set to 20 and mt set to 10, this
meant there were 425 samples of F1 and 417 samples of F2 and F3.
The results of applying the clustering method described in section
4.2.3 (step 2.3 of figure 1) are discussed in this section.
In all cases, both silhouette and manual analyses were performed.
A summary of the results can be seen in table 3. This table shows
the name, no. of clusters, silhouette score, and % of samples which
achieved a silhouette score of >0.9. The table also shows whether or
not the silhouette score gave a good indication of accurate clustering,
as determined from manual inspection. Note X = 1 is the only one
included for feature set 3 as this was the best scoring value of X .
5.1 F1 - Base Case
5.1.1 Agglomerative Clustering: Silhouette analysis was car-
ried out for the agglomerative clustering with between 2 and 20
clusters. The silhouette analysis for the case of 3, 8 and 20 clusters
can be seen in figure 8.
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Fig. 8: Silhouette analysis for agglomerative clustering using feature
set 1
In this figure, each cluster label represents the silhouette scores of
every batch sample in that cluster, sorted in increasing order. This
means that the thicker the silhouette plot for each cluster, the more
samples there are in that cluster.
As can be seen, a higher number of clusters in agglomerative
clustering performed better. The best average silhouette score was
found on the maximum 20 clusters, with an average silhouette score
of .2. However, there were big fluctuations in the silhouette scores
of members within each cluster. Manual inspection confirmed that
the clusters that scored well contained batches that had very sim-
ilar alarm sequences, however the clusters that scored above 0.9
represented only 16% of samples fed into the algorithm.
5.1.2 DBSCAN: DBSCAN in this case classified 27.3% of
samples into 13 different clusters. The average silhouette score
across all clusters was 1. A manual inspection confirmed that the
sequences of alarms in samples within each cluster were identical in
nearly all cases.
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Table 4 Samples within a high scoring cluster for DBSCAN using F1
ts Code Description
Sample 1
2016-05-05 13:08:42 a6 Pitch controller comms fault
2016-05-05 13:08:55 a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blade
Sample 2
2015-06-26 12:25:11 a6 Pitch controller comms fault
a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blade
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Fig. 9: Silhouette scores for DBSCAN using F2 features
An important point to note is that because the F1 features did not
take into account whether some alarm instances appeared simulta-
neously, in a small number of cases there were different numbers of
tss in each sample within a cluster. An example of this can be seen
in table 4, showing two samples from the same cluster. In Sample
1 the 2 alarm instances happen in sequence, whereas in Sample 2,
they happen simultaneously. This can be relevant as the root cause
related to the alarm sequence in both cases could possibly be dif-
ferent; in Sample 1 there was a pitch malfunction in the blades (i.e.
the pitch angles in all three blades were not equal), which was caused
by a communication fault in the pitch controller. In Sample 2 the two
occurred simultaneously, which in cases with more complex alarm
sequences could point to different root causes.
5.2 F2 - Incorporating Simultaneous Start Times
5.2.1 Agglomerative Clustering: Here, the optimum number
of clusters for agglomerative clustering was again found to be 20,
with a silhouette score of 0.39. Only 3.8% of samples were clustered
with a score above 0.9.
5.2.2 DBSCAN: DBSCAN once again performed much better
than agglomerative clustering, with an average silhouette score of
1 across 15 clusters, as seen in figure 9. This represented 45.1% of
samples fed into the algorithm. A manual investigation of the clus-
ters revealed that not only were the alarm sequences in each sample
within clusters identical, but each sample also had the same num-
ber of tss, i.e. the information about alarm instances that occurred
simultaneously was preserved.
5.3 F3 - Incorporating the Time Between Each ts
The above analysis was repeated using the new time-based features
for various values of X .
For this analysis, the feature array was normalised before clus-
tering, to avoid large times between tss having a disproportionate
impact.
Table 5 Example of alarm sequences found in cluster 2
ts Code Description
2015/06/29 14:44:29 a1 Blade angle asymmetry
a2 Pitch thyristor fault
2015/06/29 14:44:34 a4 Blade braking time too high
2015/06/29 14:44:37 a1 Blade angle asymmetry
a3 Pitch control deviation
a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blades
2015/06/29 14:44:38 a3 Pitch control Deviation
a5 Pitch malfunction 2 or 3 blades
2015/06/29 14:52:10 an Returning to normal operation
5.3.1 Agglomerative Clustering: The optimal number of clus-
ters across all values of X was found to be 8. With 8 clusters, the
highest average silhouette score was 0.85, for X = 1. However, a
manual inspection of the clusters showed that the samples in each
varied wildly. This was probably down to the fact that setting X = 1
means the clustering barely takes into account the actual alarms that
were generated, and focuses almost solely on the times between each
ts in a batch, which could be much greater than 1. Even after nor-
malisation, the average value of features representing these times
between each ts was 0.331, whereas the value of the features rep-
resenting the presence of a particular alarm code (i.e. the features
which are marked as “1” for X = 1) was 0.001.
For X = 10, X = 100 and X = 1000, silhouette scores were
0.82, 0.52, and 0.26, respectively. However, once again the batches
in each cluster were quite different. With manual inspection, it was
found that in batches with identical alarm sequences, there was a
wide range of possible values for the time between each ts, i.e. even
though the sequences of alarm instances in two different batches
could be identical, the time between these alarms could consider-
ably vary. This could mean that effective clustering using these extra
features was not possible.
5.3.2 DBSCAN: DBSCAN produced 7 clusters for all values of
X , with silhouette scores of 0.93, 0.91, 0.8 and 0.43 for X = 1,
X = 10, X = 100 and X = 1000, respectively. Once again man-
ual inspection showed that there was wide variation in the samples
within each cluster. This added further evidence to the fact that the
extra features created for feature set 3 were not suitable for effective
clustering.
5.4 Analysis of Results
Based on the above results, DBSCAN performed on the F2 features
yielded the best results. This resulted in 15 clusters of batches, with
each batch containing an identical sequence of alarms. 45.1% of
batches fed into the clustering algorithm were successfully assigned
a group, which represented 41% of the 456 total batches analysed
in the study. These correctly clustered batches together represented
over 134 hours of downtime on the turbine, with each stoppage
lasting an average of just below 15 minutes.
A sample of a batch from cluster 2 can be seen in table 5, showing
the progression of a fault in the pitch system. Once again, the alarm
an here is just provided to show how long the stoppage lasted in to-
tal. First, a fault in the thyristor of one of the pitch motor circuits
is detected, which simultaneously causes asymmetry in the pitch
angles across the three blades. Because of this, the turbine isn’t brak-
ing quickly enough, which sets off the a4 alarm, as well as blade
angle asymmetry alarms for the other blades, a pitch control devia-
tion alarm and a more “general” alarm showing a pitch malfunction
across more than one blade. The other batches in this cluster showed
the exact same alarm sequence, including which alarms occurred
simultaneously.
Overall, these results show that a large proportion of the alarm
sequences which occur during individual stoppages associated with
the pitch system can be accurately sorted into a number of distinct
groups. The implications of this will be discussed in the following
section.
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6 Conclusion
This work focused on attempting to sort similar sequences of alarms
as they occurred during wind turbine stoppages into several dis-
tinct groups, with the aim of reducing the burden of analysis on
turbine operators when high volume alarm showers are generated.
The alarms generated during 456 different stoppages were anal-
ysed. Sequences of alarms as they occurred during each stoppage
were identified, with each “batch” of alarm sequences being asso-
ciated with a particular stoppage. Three different sets of features
representing the alarms in each batch were extracted, and clustering
techniques applied with the aim of grouping similar batches together.
The first feature set looked solely at the order the alarms appeared in.
The next set took into account whether or not some alarms occurred
simultaneously. The third feature set took into account the time be-
tween the alarms in each batch. Two different clustering techniques,
agglomerative clustering and DBSCAN, were applied to these three
feature sets, and the results of each compared.
The results for the first feature set showed promise, with DB-
SCAN managing to accurately cluster 27.4% of samples. A draw-
back was that the samples within each cluster did not take into
account whether some alarm instances occurred simultaneously or
not. Agglomerative clustering in this case showed poor results. The
best results occurred on the second feature set using DBSCAN;
45.1% of batches were accurately sorted into fifteen distinct clusters.
In this case, whether or not some alarms occurred simultaneously
was consistent within batches. Agglomerative clustering once again
did not perform as well as hoped. The third feature set showed poor
results all round, possibly due to there being too much variance of
possible values for the time between alarm instances.
Based on these results, it is indeed possible to usefully group to-
gether similar sequences of alarm instances into distinct clusters.
This means that the burden of analysis for turbine operators during
stoppages can be reduced. If a stoppage occurs during live oper-
ation, and the resulting sequence of alarms can be attributed to a
previously identified group of similar alarm sequences which oc-
curred during past stoppages, the operator can be given information
about the shared characteristics of these stoppages rather than seeing
a cascade of individual alarms which need to be analysed. This infor-
mation can be related to what corrective action, if any, was generally
taken in the past, the severity of the fault and duration of associated
down time, the root cause or other information to help diagnose the
fault, whether the stoppage was controller-related, or others. As well
as this, the frequency of particular alarm sequences can be tracked,
which can give more information and context than simply tracking
the frequency of individual alarms.
The natural extension to this work involves investigating the dif-
ferent types of stoppages to identify their shared characteristics.
Once these characteristics have been identified, not only can they
be used for diagnosing future faults and deciding on the appropriate
course of action post-occurrence, but can also be used for predic-
tive purposes. By overlaying the times that particular past alarm
sequences occurred over historical SCADA data, machine learning
models can be trained to find certain leading indicators in the op-
erational data that this particular type of alarm sequence may be
imminent. As the live data then shows some of these indicators,
operators can be given advance warning of a specific type of fault,
along with an estimated window of when the fault will occur. With
knowledge of the set of shared characteristics that this stoppage is
likely to have, an appropriate course of action can be decided upon
in advance, and preventative, rather than corrective, action can be
taken.
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